Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Recent episodes

1. [25-1083] Mullin v. Doe

   Apr 29, 2026

   Mullin v. Doe Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2026. Petitioner: Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security. Respondent: Dahlia Doe. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners) Ahilan T. Arulanantham (for the Respondents in Case No. 25-1083) Geoffrey M. Pipoly (for the Respondents in Case No. 25-1084) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Congress created the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program to allow foreign nationals from countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disasters, or other extraordinary conditions to live and work legally in the United States on a temporary basis. Federal law requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to periodically review conditions in each designated country and, after consulting with other government agencies, determine whether those conditions still justify protection. Syria has held TPS designation for years, shielding its nationals from deportation to a country ravaged by civil war and humanitarian crisis. Shortly after taking office in January 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14159, directing the Secretary to aggressively limit TPS designations. Secretary Kristi Noem then terminated TPS for Syria on September 19, 2025, with an effective date of November 21, 2025 — giving roughly 6,100 Syrian TPS holders weeks to lose their legal status, work authorization, and protection from deportation. Seven Syrian nationals with family ties in the United States sued, arguing that the termination violated federal immigration law, was arbitrary and capricious, and reflected discriminatory animus rather than a genuine, good-faith review of conditions in Syria. The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion and postponed the termination effective November 19, 2025; the government appealed and moved to stay that order, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the stay on February 17, 2026, concluding that the government had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. Question Did the Trump administration lawfully end the Temporary Protected Status program for Syrian nationals?

2. [24-889] Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.

   Apr 29, 2026

   Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2026. Petitioner: Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. Respondent: Amarin Pharma, Inc. Advocates: Charles B. Klein (for the Petitioners) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Michael R. Huston (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Amarin Pharma markets icosapent ethyl under the brand name Vascepa. In 2012, the FDA approved Vascepa for treating severe hypertriglyceridemia (the SH indication), which affects patients with blood triglyceride levels of at least 500 mg/dL. In 2019, following additional research and clinical trials, the FDA approved Vascepa for a second use: reducing cardiovascular risk in patients with triglyceride levels of at least 150 mg/dL (the CV indication). Amarin listed two patents covering the CV indication in the FDA’s Orange Book. In 2016, Hikma Pharmaceuticals submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application seeking approval for a generic version of icosapent ethyl. When the CV indication was approved in 2019, Hikma filed a “section viii statement” seeking FDA approval only for the SH indication by “carving out” the patented CV indication from its label—creating a “skinny label.” The FDA approved Hikma’s ANDA in May 2020. Throughout 2020, Hikma issued press releases referring to its product as the “generic version” or “generic equivalent” of Vascepa, describing Vascepa as indicated “in part” for the SH indication, and citing Vascepa sales figures (over $1 billion annually) that were attributable primarily to the CV indication. Hikma also marketed its product on its website under the therapeutic category “Hypertriglyceridemia” and as “AB” rated, though with a disclaimer that it was approved for fewer indications than Vascepa. In November 2020, Amarin sued Hikma for induced infringement of its CV indication patents. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware granted Hikma’s motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Amarin’s allegations—based on Hikma’s skinny label combined with its press releases and marketing materials—plausibly stated a claim for induced infringement. Question 1. When a generic drug manufacturer excludes a patented use from its label, can it still be liable for inducing infringement if it calls its product a “generic version” of the brand-name drug and cites publicly available information about the brand-name drug’s sales? 2. Can a patent infringement complaint survive dismissal if it does not allege that the defendant made any statement specifically instructing or encouraging the patented use?

3. [24-856] Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I

   Apr 28, 2026

   Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2026. Petitioner: Cisco Systems, Inc. Respondent: Doe I. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Paul L. Hoffman (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party initiated a campaign of persecution—referred to as “douzheng”—against practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual discipline derived from Buddhism that grew rapidly in popularity across China. In 1999, the Party formally sought to eliminate Falun Gong through detention, forced conversion, and torture, designating it an illegal organization. To support these efforts, the Chinese authorities envisioned a nationwide surveillance system named the “Golden Shield,” designed to monitor online activity, identify practitioners, and facilitate their apprehension. Because China lacked the necessary technological infrastructure, Chinese officials sought help from Western firms. Cisco Systems, Inc., a U.S.-based tech company, allegedly responded with enthusiasm: from its headquarters in San Jose, California, Cisco pursued contracts, developed Golden Shield software and hardware, and provided training and support to Chinese security officers. Plaintiffs alleged that without Cisco’s technology—including advanced databases, real-time monitoring systems, and network optimization tools—Chinese authorities could not have effectively tracked, detained, or tortured Falun Gong adherents. Plaintiffs in this case include thirteen Chinese nationals and one U.S. citizen, Charles Lee, who claim they were targeted using Cisco’s technology and then detained, tortured, and subjected to psychological and physical abuse. Some plaintiffs reported multiple detentions and long-term surveillance; others described instances of torture facilitated by personalized information drawn from Golden Shield databases. Several allege that the abuses led to the deaths of family members. They contend that the design, development, and optimization of Cisco’s technology—and its tailored marketing to support Falun Gong persecution—enabled widespread human rights abuses undertaken by Chinese state and Party officials. The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 2011, bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). The district court dismissed all claims, finding them insufficiently connected to the United States and lacking the necessary legal support for aiding and abetting liability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that aiding and abetting liability is actionable under both the ATS and the TVPA and that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged Cisco’s knowing participation in a domestic context. Question Does either the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act allow a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting?

4. [25-112] Chatrie v. United States

   Apr 27, 2026

   Chatrie v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2026. Petitioner: Okello T. Chatrie. Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Okello Chatrie was arrested in connection with the armed robbery of a bank in Richmond, Virginia, where an individual entered the Call Federal Credit Union, threatened employees and patrons with a handgun, and escaped with $195,000. The robbery was captured by surveillance footage, which showed the perpetrator appearing to talk on a cellphone. Lacking viable leads, Detective Joshua Hylton applied for a “geofence warrant” in June 2019. This novel form of warrant compelled Google to provide location data for all devices that had been near the robbery site within a one-hour window around the time of the crime. The geofence specified a 150-meter radius centered on the bank, encompassing not only the crime scene but also public streets, private residences, a hotel, a church, and a restaurant. Google responded with anonymized location data of devices within the geofence during the specified time. The government then requested two additional sets of data from Google: (1) expanded location data from nine of the original nineteen users, covering movements outside the geofence over a longer timeframe, and (2) identifying information for three of those users. One account belonged to Chatrie. Based on this data, law enforcement identified him as the suspect, arrested him, and charged him in federal court. Chatrie moved to suppress the location data obtained through the geofence warrant, arguing that it violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the warrant likely violated the Fourth Amendment but declined to suppress the evidence under the good-faith exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion. While the panel sharply disagreed both on whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred and whether the warrant was constitutionally valid, all judges agreed that any defect was ultimately excused under the good-faith exception. Question Did the execution of the geofence warrant violate the Fourth Amendment?

5. [24-1068] Monsanto Company v. Durnell

   Apr 27, 2026

   Monsanto Company v. Durnell Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2026. Petitioner: Monsanto Company. Respondent: John L. Durnell. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Ashley C. Keller (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) John L. Durnell used Monsanto’s product Roundup, a herbicide containing the active ingredient glyphosate. Durnell subsequently developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, which he alleged was caused by his exposure to Roundup and glyphosate. In January 2019, Durnell sued Monsanto, asserting claims for strict liability defective design, strict liability failure to warn, and negligence. Durnell claimed that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label to alert users to the risk of developing non-Hodgkin's lymphoma from glyphosate exposure. After a jury trial in September 2023 in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, the jury found in favor of Durnell on his strict liability failure to warn claim and awarded him $1.25 million in compensatory damages, but ruled for Monsanto on the defective design and negligence claims. Monsanto moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that federal law—specifically the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)—both expressly and impliedly preempted Durnell’s failure to warn claim. The trial court denied the motion, and Monsanto appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, which affirmed the judgment. Question Does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempt a label-based failure-to-warn claim where EPA has not required the warning?

6. [25-429] Blanche v. Lau

   Apr 22, 2026

   Blanche v. Lau Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2026. Petitioner: Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General. Respondent: Muk Choi Lau. Advocates: Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioner) Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Muk Choi Lau, a native and citizen of China, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on September 7, 2007, after several years of traveling to the country as a nonimmigrant. On May 7, 2012, Lau was charged in New Jersey with third-degree trademark counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, he left the United States for a brief period. Upon returning on June 15, 2012, he presented himself at John F. Kennedy International Airport as a returning lawful permanent resident. However, because of his pending charge, immigration authorities declined to admit him outright and instead paroled him into the country pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Over a year later, in June 2013, Lau pleaded guilty to the counterfeiting charge and was sentenced to two years’ probation. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Lau in March 2014, charging him with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Lau argued that he should not have been treated as an arriving alien at the time of reentry and that he was eligible for a discretionary waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The immigration judge rejected both claims, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Lau petitioned for review, arguing primarily that DHS lacked clear and convincing evidence to treat him as an applicant for admission on reentry merely due to a then-pending charge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, holding that DHS erred in treating Lau as inadmissible based solely on unproven allegations at the time of reentry and granted his petition. The immigration judge ordered removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld that decision in 2021. The Second Circuit vacated the removal order in 2025 and remanded the case to terminate proceedings under the inadmissibility ground, reserving the possibility of future removal under a deportability provision. Question To remove a lawful permanent resident who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, must the government prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the lawful permanent resident’s last reentry into the United States?

7. [25-406] Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc.

   Apr 21, 2026

   Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2026. Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al. Respondent: AT&T, Inc. . Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (for AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.) Vivek Suri (for the FCC, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Between 2014 and 2019, AT&T operated a location-based services program in which it collected and shared its customers’ mobile location data with third-party service providers such as Life Alert and AAA. To provide this data, AT&T contracted with “location aggregators,” who in turn resold the data to service providers. AT&T required those providers to obtain customer consent for each location request and reviewed their procedures, but it did not directly verify customer consent before transferring data. In 2018, news reports began revealing that some service providers misused or failed to adequately protect customers’ location data. In response, AT&T halted access for those providers, and by March 2019, shuttered the entire location-data program. Prompted by these reports, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated an investigation and in 2020 issued a Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL), proposing a $57 million fine for AT&T’s purported violations of Section 222 of the Communications Act of 1934 and corresponding FCC regulations. AT&T challenged the classification of location data as “customer proprietary network information” (CPNI), asserted it had acted reasonably, and raised constitutional objections. After reviewing AT&T’s written response, the FCC rejected its defenses and issued a forfeiture order. Significantly, the FCC imposed the fine without a hearing or trial; AT&T’s only opportunity to respond occurred through written submissions to the agency. AT&T paid the fine and petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, holding that the FCC’s in-house enforcement process violated AT&T’s rights under Article III and the Seventh Amendment. Question Are provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 that govern the Federal Communications Commission’s assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III?

8. [25-466] Sripetch v. SEC

   Apr 20, 2026

   Sripetch v. SEC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2026. Petitioner: Ongkaruck Sripetch. Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) From at least 2013 to 2019, Ongkaruck Sripetch participated in a series of fraudulent securities schemes involving at least 20 microcap, or “penny,” stock companies. Working alongside various associates and through multiple entities, Sripetch acquired discounted shares of small-cap companies and then secretly funded promotional campaigns to inflate their stock prices before selling his own holdings into the artificially heightened market—a practice known as stock scalping. He also engaged in unregistered sales of securities, most notably through control of a company called Abby Inc., and manipulated trading in another company, VMS Rehab Systems, through matched trades and wash trades designed to create the illusion of market activity. Later, he organized pump-and-dump schemes for Argus Worldwide stock, using matched trading to build trading volume before dumping shares after promotions without disclosing his intent to sell. In 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a civil enforcement action against Sripetch and others. In 2023, Sripetch consented to a bifurcated judgment, agreeing to the SEC’s allegations for the purposes of remedies. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California found him liable for $2.25 million in disgorgement and over $1 million in interest. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the SEC may obtain disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing that investors suffered pecuniary harm, joining a circuit split on this question. Question May the SEC seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm?

9. [25-197] T. M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation

   Apr 20, 2026

   T. M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2026. Petitioner: T. M. Respondent: University of Maryland Medical System Corporation. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In March 2023, T.M., a woman with a rare medical condition that triggers psychosis upon consuming gluten, was involuntarily committed to Baltimore Washington Medical Center after an episode. Her treating psychiatrist sought and received state approval to forcibly administer antipsychotic medication; T.M. contested this but was unsuccessful in administrative proceedings. Independent psychiatrists later stated that T.M. no longer required inpatient care. To secure her release, T.M. and the hospital negotiated an oral agreement, which was formalized as a state court consent order. The order allowed her to leave the hospital on the condition that she comply with ongoing psychiatric treatment and medications, switch providers, and drop pending lawsuits. Her parents, J.M. and A.M., were also bound to notify authorities if she failed to comply. Ten days later, represented by new counsel, T.M. and her parents filed the present federal lawsuit claiming that the consent order was unconstitutional and entered under duress. They challenged the order as violating T.M.’s due process rights and sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating its enforcement. They did not request damages or challenge the initial commitment decisions. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the lawsuit. It held that T.M.’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, because they amounted to a request for federal review of a state court judgment. It also dismissed the parents’ claims for failure to state a constitutional violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that T.M. was a “state-court loser” seeking to undo a state judgment still reviewable in Maryland courts. Nonetheless, it remanded for the district court to modify T.M.’s dismissal to be without prejudice, due to lack of jurisdiction. Question Can the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court?

10. [25-365] Trump v. Barbara

    Apr 1, 2026

    Trump v. Barbara Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 1, 2026. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States. Respondent: Barbara. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners) Cecillia D. Wang (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160, titled “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship,” which declared that individuals born in the United States are not U.S. citizens at birth if their parents lack sufficient legal status. Specifically, the order directs federal agencies not to recognize citizenship claims for children born after February 20, 2025, if: (1) the mother was unlawfully present in the U.S. and the father was neither a U.S. citizen nor a lawful permanent resident (LPR), or (2) the mother’s presence in the U.S. was lawful but temporary and the father was not a U.S. citizen or LPR. The order was issued on the alleged basis that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause does not confer birthright citizenship on such children because they are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States in the constitutional sense. Three families challenged the order on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals. One class representative is Barbara, a Honduran asylum applicant whose child is due in October 2025. Another is Susan, a Taiwanese citizen in the country on a student visa whose daughter was born in April 2025; her child’s passport application was in progress at the time of the suit. The third is Mark, a Brazilian applicant for permanent residence whose son was born in March 2025 and initially received a U.S. passport. These families filed suit under pseudonyms, alleging that the Executive Order unlawfully strips their children of citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a). They seek to preserve access to citizenship-related benefits including Social Security, SNAP, and Medicaid. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire issued a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified a nationwide class of children affected by the order. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional and statutory claims. That decision was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and before a ruling from that court, the Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment. Question Is a presidential executive order that denies U.S. birthright citizenship to children born in the United States because their parents are unlawfully present or in the country on temporary visas consistent with the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)?

11. [24-7351] Pitchford v. Cain

    Mar 31, 2026

    Pitchford v. Cain Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 31, 2026. Petitioner: Terry Pitchford. Respondent: Burl Cain, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections. Advocates: Joseph J. Perkovich (for the Petitioner) Scott G. Stewart (for the Respondents) Emily M. Ferguson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Terry Pitchford was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the 2004 armed robbery and killing of Reuben Britt, a store owner in Grenada County, Mississippi. At the time of the crime, Pitchford was 18 years old. He confessed to participating in the robbery, although the fatal shot was fired by his accomplice. At Pitchford’s 2006 trial in the Grenada County Circuit Court, the jury was selected from a pool that included 36 white and five Black potential jurors. The prosecution used peremptory strikes to remove four of the five Black prospective jurors. Pitchford’s counsel raised a Batson objection, alleging that the strikes were racially discriminatory. The trial court found Pitchford had made a prima facie showing of discrimination and required the prosecution to provide race-neutral reasons for each strike. The prosecutor cited explanations such as the venirepersons’ criminal histories, perceived mental health issues, or similarities to the defendant. The trial judge accepted those explanations and allowed the strikes, ultimately empaneling a jury that included only one Black juror. Pitchford’s counsel sought to preserve Batson-related objections during a bench conference, emphasizing the racial composition of the jury and the county, but did not conduct a further comparative analysis or expressly argue that the prosecution’s stated reasons were pretextual. Pitchford’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Mississippi Supreme Court, which held that any pretext arguments had been waived for failure to raise them clearly at trial. A federal district court later granted habeas relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling the Mississippi Supreme Court had reasonably applied Batson and its waiver rule. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably determined, under AEDPA, that Pitchford waived his right to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral justifications for the challenged juror strikes. Question Did the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably decide—under the standards set by federal habeas law—that Terry Pitchford gave up his right to argue that the prosecutor’s explanations for striking four Black jurors were false or racially biased?

12. [25-5146] Abouammo v. United States

    Mar 30, 2026

    Abouammo v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2026. Petitioner: Ahmad Abouammo. Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Tobias S. Loss-Eaton (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2013, Twitter hired Ahmad Abouammo, a U.S. citizen, as a Media Partnerships Manager responsible for high-profile users in the Middle East and North Africa. Through this role, he became involved with Bader Binasaker, a close aide to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Beginning in 2014, Abouammo used his access to Twitter’s proprietary tools to gather nonpublic information—including email addresses, phone numbers, and IP data—about Saudi dissident Twitter users, particularly accounts critical of the Saudi royal family. He transmitted this information to Binasaker—circumstantially inferred through encrypted messaging services—and was rewarded with lavish gifts, including a luxury Hublot watch, and over $300,000 in wire transfers to a Lebanese bank account held in his father’s name. Communication between the two included expressions of intent to “delete evil,” suggesting the sensitive nature of their collaboration. After leaving Twitter in 2015, Abouammo continued to facilitate communication between Saudi representatives and Twitter, allegedly under the guise of social media consulting. In October 2018, FBI agents approached him as part of an investigation into unauthorized access of Twitter accounts connected to Saudi espionage. During the interview at his Seattle home, Abouammo denied wrongdoing and claimed he was paid for legitimate consulting. While the agents waited in his home, Abouammo fabricated an invoice to substantiate this claim and emailed it to them. The actions connected to the allegedly falsified document—including the questioning, fabrication, and transmission—all took place in Seattle. The agents who received the document, though physically present in Seattle at the time, worked out of the FBI field office in San Francisco. A grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California indicted Abouammo for falsifying a record with intent to obstruct a federal investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, among other charges. Abouammo moved to dismiss the falsification count for improper venue, arguing that all relevant conduct occurred in Seattle. The district court denied the motion, holding venue proper in the Northern District because the statute required an intent to obstruct an investigation based there. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that venue is proper in a district where the obstructed investigation occurred, even if none of the defendant’s physical conduct took place there. Question Is venue proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute’s intent element “contemplates” effects that could occur there?

13. [25-83] Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties

    Mar 30, 2026

    Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2026. Petitioner: Adrian Jules. Respondent: Andre Balazs Properties. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner) Daniel L. Geyser (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont hotel in Los Angeles until he was fired in March 2020. In December 2020, he sued multiple individuals and affiliated corporate entities in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging discrimination and other claims under both federal and state law. He invoked federal-question jurisdiction under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Jules signed with Chateau Marmont, which was not initially named as a party. The district court stayed the litigation pending arbitration but did not formally compel arbitration, as the agreement required arbitration to occur in California, outside that court’s district. Jules proceeded to arbitrate his claims against Chateau alone. The arbitrator ultimately ruled against him on all claims and sanctioned him and his attorney for misconduct during the arbitration. After the award, Jules returned to the district court, seeking to vacate it, while Chateau and other defendants sought to confirm it—even though some of them were not parties to the arbitration proceeding. Jules argued that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Badgerow v. Walters, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm the award because the post-arbitration petitions, on their face, did not establish federal jurisdiction. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed the award, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that because the court had jurisdiction over the original, stayed lawsuit, it retained jurisdiction over subsequent applications to confirm or vacate the arbitration award. That ruling deepened a split among the courts of appeals, prompting the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Question Does a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintain jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking?

14. [24-935] Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock

    Mar 25, 2026

    Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2026. Petitioner: Flower Foods, Inc., et al. Respondent: Angelo Brock. Advocates: Traci L. Lovitt (for the Petitioners) Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners—the defendants, collectively known as “Flowers”—produce and sell packaged baked goods throughout the United States. Flowers utilizes a “direct-store-delivery” system, contracting with individuals it classifies as independent distributors who purchase the rights to distribute its products within specific geographic territories. In 2016, Angelo Brock, operating as Brock, Inc., signed a “Distributor Agreement” with Flowers Baking Co. of Denver, LLC (“Flowers Denver”) to distribute products in parts of Colorado. This agreement, along with a “Personal Guaranty” Brock signed, included a mandatory Arbitration Agreement stipulating that disputes must be resolved under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Under this arrangement, Brock, Inc. placed orders for products, most of which were produced by Flowers bakeries located out of state, specifically to fill those orders. Flowers shipped the goods to a warehouse in Denver. Brock picked up the products at the warehouse, loaded them onto his own vehicle, and delivered them to his customers—various retail stores located only within Colorado. Brock himself did not cross state lines while making these deliveries. The business relationship soured, and Brock filed a lawsuit alleging Flowers misclassified its distributors as independent contractors to systematically underpay them, asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Colorado labor law. Brock filed his putative class and collective action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Flowers moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ agreement, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that Brock falls within the FAA’s § 1 exemption for transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision. Question Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce—but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders—“transportation workers” “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the exemption in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act?

15. [25-6] Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated

    Mar 24, 2026

    Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2026. Petitioner: Thomas Keathley. Respondent: Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) William M. Jay (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Thomas Keathley filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in December 2019. In August 2021, while his bankruptcy case was ongoing, Keathley was in a motor vehicle collision with David Fowler, a truck driver employed by Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. (BAC). Keathley hired a personal injury attorney the next day and subsequently filed a personal injury lawsuit against BAC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in December 2021, alleging negligence and vicarious liability. Keathley, however, failed to disclose this new personal injury lawsuit as a potential asset to the bankruptcy court. He submitted multiple amended bankruptcy plans in March 2022 and June 2022, none of which mentioned the pending lawsuit. The bankruptcy court confirmed Keathley’s modified plan in July 2022, unaware of the personal injury claim. Keathley only amended his bankruptcy schedule to include the lawsuit after BAC moved to dismiss the personal injury case. BAC moved for summary judgment in the personal injury suit, arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Keathley’s claim because he failed to disclose it during his bankruptcy proceeding. The district court granted BAC’s motion, dismissing the lawsuit, and subsequently denied Keathley's motion for reconsideration. Keathley then appealed both of those decisions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decisions. Question May the doctrine of judicial estoppel be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a potential motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in fact acted in bad faith?

16. [25-5] Noem v. Al Otro Lado

    Mar 24, 2026

    Noem v. Al Otro Lado Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2026. Petitioner: Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security. Respondent: Al Otro Lado, a California Corporation. Advocates: Vivek Suri (for the Petitioners) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented a “metering” policy at ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border to manage asserted capacity constraints. CBP officers stationed at the physical boundary line turned away asylum seekers lacking valid travel documents, preventing them from stepping onto U.S. soil to undergo mandatory inspection and processing. These officials instructed migrants to return to Mexico and wait for future processing opportunities, often without providing specific appointment times, forcing numerous asylum seekers to endure prolonged delays in Mexican border towns where they faced significant safety risks. While these asylum seekers waited, the federal government promulgated the “Asylum Transit Rule” in 2019, which generally rendered noncitizens ineligible for asylum if they traveled through a third country without first seeking protection there. This regulatory change prejudiced individuals previously turned away under the metering policy because, had CBP processed them upon their initial arrival, the Transit Rule would not have applied to their claims. Al Otro Lado, a legal aid organization, joined thirteen individual asylum seekers to file a class-action lawsuit challenging the metering policy and seeking to prevent the government from applying the Transit Rule to those who attempted to enter before its enactment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California declared the metering policy unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and permanently enjoined the government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to class members . The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the policy unlawfully withheld mandatory agency action, but narrowed the injunction to prevent the district court from forcing the government to unilaterally reopen past asylum denials. Question Does a noncitizen who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border “arrive[] in the United States” within the meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act?

17. [24-1260] Watson v. Republican National Committee

    Mar 23, 2026

    Watson v. Republican National Committee Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 23, 2026. Petitioner: Michael Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State. Respondent: Republican National Committee, et al. Advocates: Scott G. Stewart (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) D. John Sauer (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Federal statutes designate the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the uniform day for electing members of Congress and appointing presidential electors. While Mississippi requires voters to cast absentee ballots by this federal deadline, the state legislature amended its election code in 2020 to permit the counting of mail-in ballots received up to five business days after Election Day, provided they are postmarked by that Tuesday. This “postmark rule” allows validly cast votes delayed by mail service to be included in the final tally, a practice currently utilized by approximately thirty states. In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, and individual voters filed suit against Mississippi Secretary of State Michael Watson and county election officials. The plaintiffs argued that the federal statutes establishing a singular “election” day preempt Mississippi’s five-day receipt window, contending that an election is not legally concluded until officials actually receive the ballots. They sought to invalidate the state statute and enjoin officials from counting any absentee ballots received after federal Election Day. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state officials, ruling that the state law did not conflict with federal statutes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that federal law preempts the Mississippi statute because ballots must be both cast and received by Election Day. Question Do the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day?

18. [24-1238] Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC

    Mar 4, 2026

    Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 4, 2026. Petitioner: Shawn Montgomery. Respondent: Caribe Transport II, LLC. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the Respondents) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when his tractor-trailer, stopped on the shoulder of an Illinois highway, was struck by another truck. The other driver, Yosniel Varela-Mojena, was employed by the motor carrier Caribe Transport II, LLC (“Caribe”). C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (“Robinson”), a freight broker, had arranged for Caribe to haul the shipment. Robinson and Caribe operated under an agreement stating that Caribe was an independent contractor and retained exclusive control over its personnel and the manner of its performance. Montgomery sued the driver and Caribe, and also sued the broker, Robinson. His claims against Robinson alleged that the broker was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence, arguing Caribe was Robinson’s agent. Montgomery also claimed Robinson had negligently hired the driver and the carrier. The district court granted judgment to Robinson on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Caribe was an independent contractor, which defeated the vicarious liability claim, and that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempted the state-law negligent hiring claim. Question Does 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver?

19. [24-1063] Hunter v. United States

    Mar 3, 2026

    Hunter v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2026. Petitioner: Munson P. Hunter. Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Munson P. Hunter, III pleaded guilty to committing wire fraud affecting a financial institution and to aiding and abetting. A federal district court sentenced him to 51 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. A specific condition of that supervised release requires Hunter to take any mental health medication prescribed by his physician. Hunter challenged his sentence at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing the medication condition infringed on his due process liberty interests and that the written judgment improperly included the “aiding and abetting” reference. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal regarding the medication condition, finding it was barred by an appeal waiver in Hunter's plea agreement, and affirmed the judgment, noting that the “aiding and abetting” charge was indeed part of the count to which Hunter pleaded guilty. Question 1. Does an appeal waiver bar all claims except for ineffective assistance of counsel or a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum? 2. Does such a waiver become ineffective if the sentencing judge later tells the defendant they can appeal, and the government fails to object?

20. [24-1234] United States v. Hemani

    Mar 2, 2026

    United States v. Hemani Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2026. Petitioner: United States of America. Respondent: Ali Danial Hemani. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner) Erin E. Murphy (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A grand jury indicted Ali Danial Hemani in February 2023 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), a federal law prohibiting firearm possession by an “unlawful user of…a controlled substance.” The indictment alleged that in August 2022, Hemani knowingly possessed a Glock 19 9mm pistol while being an unlawful user of controlled substances. The government specified that Hemani allegedly used marijuana, promethazine, and cocaine. The pistol was located in the closet of Hemani’s parents’ home. Crucially, the prosecution did not allege that Hemani was intoxicated or using a controlled substance at the precise time he possessed the firearm. The government’s case rested on his status as a regular drug user, not on simultaneous use and possession. Hemani filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing the law was unconstitutional as applied to him. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that a binding regional precedent (United States v. Connelly) rendered the law’s application to Hemani unconstitutional. Question Does a federal law that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” violate the respondent’s Second Amendment right to bear arms?