Helm Talks - energy climate infrastructure & more

As oil prices continue to fluctuate in global markets, Britain’s energy costs have become a distinctly British crisis. They cannot be explained away as a temporary consequence of global events. Industrial electricity prices continue to be among the highest in the developed world, consumer bills remain high, and there is little prospect of relief even in the longer term without a fundamental rethink of policy. At the heart of the argument is the fact that wind and solar alone cannot deliver cheap, secure, homegrown energy. The full energy system costs, of electricity grids, backup, storage and firm power, have been underestimated, and this matters hugely for competitiveness, industry, AI and future economic growth. Energy realism means that Britain needs to face the hard choices about what sort of energy system can deliver affordability, security and climate progress together. The current government is persisting with its predecessors’ slogans. It is tinkering with subsidies and marginal fixes, but what is needed is structural reform now.

Recent prime ministers have become very good at the politics of the long grass, and Andy Burnham is at risk of following this line. Promise the big things: growth, clean rivers, better defence, cheaper energy, new nuclear, decent transport and social care. Then push the hard choices beyond the next election, offer short-term palliatives, and hope that someone else will eventually pick up the bill. The result is not merely delay; such an approach actually results in higher costs in the long term, weaker infrastructure, and yet another obstacle to the growth that he, and many of his predecessors claim to want. What is needed right now in Britain is not another slogan, mission or target, but a serious long-term framework for investing in the much-needed assets: energy, water, transport, communications and defence. The politics of the long term is harder than the politics of the long grass, but, without it, Britain will keep choosing affordability today at the expense of prosperity tomorrow, and at the risk of passing on an inheritance to the next generation that is much poorer than the one it inherited.

Following on from the latest change of Prime Minister and announcements about his new Cabinet, what is going to change? Andy Burnham has a new ten-year plan, and is promising a fundamental revision of politics, but Britain’s deeper economic problems remain unresolved. The fact is, underneath the headlines, the country is still trying to live beyond its means, with high borrowing, weak growth and rising debt interest putting serious pressure on its public finances. Three key costs are holding the economy back: labour, capital and energy. Higher employment costs, high interest rates and expensive electricity all make it harder for British businesses to compete, and small political fixes will not be enough. If Burnham wants to make the radical turnaround he is promising, a more honest national debate about public finances, competitiveness and economic growth is needed. Without a serious, long-term economic strategy, the underlying problems will continue to build, whatever the political headlines of the day.

As another heatwave grips the UK and much of Europe, we need to look beyond the immediate discomfort of hot weather and ask why existing policies are failing to dent the relentless rise in the carbon concentration in the atmosphere. More wind farms and solar panels are not going to crack the problem. Climate policy must be judged not by good intentions, but by its real-world costs, impacts and global effectiveness. Renewables alone cannot deliver cheap, secure and clean energy. The wider costs of electricity systems, storage, back-up power and networks also need to be taken into account. The UK’s choices need to be seen in the international context and compared with the energy strategies of major economies such as China, the US and those in Europe. No other country thinks relying on wind and solar plus a bit of nuclear is going to power a modern economy. A broader mix of technologies, including nuclear power, and a willingness to confront the costs of pollution created by our own consumption are needed. Climate change is real, action is essential, but policy must be practical, affordable and effective if it is to make a meaningful difference. The UK fails on all counts.

With the renewed political enthusiasm for nationalisation, what, in practical terms, does it mean and what would actually change? How might “Manchesterism” apply in practice? Using buses, rail, water and electricity as examples, in this podcast I argue that public ownership and public control are not the same thing, and that different sectors require different models of organisation, regulation and investment. Appeals to “take back control” are simplistic, and need to be examined with a focus on the long-term funding, planning and delivery needs of core infrastructure. While the nationalisation debate is useful, it needs to move beyond rhetoric towards detailed questions about ownership, regulation, incentives and the proper role of the state.

Politicians have been seeking for decades to put right the infrastructure crisis in this country that is rooted not in a lack of ambition, but in deeper economic and political constraints. Building in Britain is exceptionally costly, with high energy prices, high labour costs and high financing costs making major projects difficult to deliver at scale. At the same time, the country saves too little to fund long-term investment, leaving infrastructure heavily reliant on foreign capital, while government is constrained by debt and rising interest payments, and repeatedly prioritises short-term spending over capital renewal. Taking Thames Water as a case study, regulatory hesitation and political short-termism have both delayed necessary restructuring and entrenched decline. Meaningful renewal will require more than rhetoric: it demands lower input costs, stronger incentives to save and invest, firmer control of public debt, and a clear political willingness to favour long-term capital investment over immediate consumption. Without a whole-economy approach, the goal will remain elusive.

The International Energy Agency describes the current Iran conflict as the “biggest energy crisis in history”. While oil prices have risen sharply, they remain below the real highs of past shocks. However, the impact is being felt very differently around the world, with some countries even benefiting from the situation. For example, the US and Russia are relatively well placed as major producers, while China and India have buffers through their domestic coal, stockpiles and alternative supplies. Europe, by contrast – especially the UK and Germany – is very exposed because of its energy choices and growing dependence on imported gas. Markets are already adapting: higher prices encourage new production, alternative routes, and renewed interest in nuclear and other energy sources. Rather than dramatic headlines, this podcast focuses on the more complex reality: an energy problem with very different consequences across the world, not a single historic crisis.

The concept of a zero-sum game was fashionable in the 1970s. The idea was simple: competing interest groups, and especially unions, would fight for ever-bigger shares of the nation’s cake, and their gains would mean losses to others. Fast forward to 2026, and what we have now is a negative-sum game: cake for some reduces the cake for others, and reduces the size of the cake. The result is lower economic growth. This is indeed playing out now: the government’s core motors for economic growth – 1.5 million new houses, net zero – are all coming up against the need to pay for more welfare and other public services. To cover all this, the government has raised taxes, notably on the business costs of labour, and borrowed a lot more. The result: higher labour costs and higher costs of capital. Add to this the highest costs of industrial energy in the developed economies, and the results for economic growth can only be negative. Now add in the new renters’ rights with increased costs to landlords, and thence the supply of rented housing going down, whilst the higher labour costs have increased the costs of building new houses and reduced demand. 1979 is with us again. The negative-sum game is not sustainable, and thus it will not be sustained.

There is no such thing as a free lunch, and there is no such thing as “free” electricity. What is true is that there are going to be days in summer when supply exceeds demands and hence the value of electricity generated will be zero. Surpluses arise because a renewables-based system needs far more total generating capacity to guarantee supply at all times, including when the sun is not shining and the wind is not blowing. Using the UK as an example, meeting a peak demand of around 45GW may require roughly double the capacity compared with the “bad old days” of fossil-fuel-based generation, as well as twice the grid system and lots of batteries and storage. There are bound to be times when lots of that 120GW is generating but demand is low. But excess electricity does not reduce the costs. These don’t magically go away. Investors will build wind, solar and nuclear plants only if they are paid through mechanisms such as fixed-price contracts, and households also need to fund the expanded grid, balancing and storage required to handle the extra capacity. As a result, “free” electricity during certain periods will still be paid for elsewhere – ultimately by consumers and taxpayers. Renewables are a good thing, but they need to be accompanied by an honest public discussion about the real system costs of decarbonisation rather than the promise of free energy.

Another day and another bit of sticky plaster is applied. With the highest industrial energy prices in the developed world, the government is increasing the number of companies that will get a bit off their bills in 2027. This follows other moves, like the £150 off customer bills. It will not be enough, given the sheer scale of the problems. The industrial crisis will go on; domestic bills are scheduled to go up and stay up for the next decade; new energy-intensive inward investment (e.g. for data centres) is being deterred; and where there are projects, own generation from gas is the route to firm power. The facts are not changing, and it is getting ever more painful to ignore them. Climate realism means facing up to the relentless increase in the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere, the continuing 85% of the world’s energy supplies coming from fossil fuels, and the lack of any transition away from this, with the oil, gas and coal burn going ever up as the world energy demand looks set to double by 2050. Renewables on a system basis are not cheap. It takes 120GW now to meet the same peak 45GW demand, which 60GW once comfortably met, as well as doubling the transmission grid and adding all the extra batteries and storage. The renewables are not “home-grown” – the supply chains are foreign. Britain is not on a path to home-grown energy. It is not cheap, and other countries are not looking to Britain as a “clean-energy superpower”. They look to Britain to find out how not to do it – no one else wants the highest energy prices. It’s not difficult to sort all this out, but more sticky plasters will make the situation worse and harder to fix the longer the government ducks the need for a fundamental re-set of British energy policy.

The news is very much about gas price shocks, but this is to misunderstand the fundamental difference between temporary shocks and long-term trends. Gas prices spike when major geopolitical events occur (e.g. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz), but then often fall sharply afterwards. Such fluctuations are nothing new and should be expected, but they don’t prove that gas is inherently unstable or that the UK can simply “get out of gas” by relying more on wind, solar, and some nuclear. Despite two decades of expanding renewables, the UK still depends on gas for about 35% of its energy, with heating and industry making full exit impossible anytime soon. At the same time, the UK is not making good use of its own North Sea gas. Current policy effectively discourages domestic production through limited licences and heavy windfall taxes, while simultaneously encouraging imports, even though imported LNG is more polluting and exposes the UK to foreign supply risks. The claim being made that domestic gas always has to follow world prices is misleading – long-term contracts once gave the UK stable, predictable gas supplies, and could do so again, if the government required such contracts as a licensing condition. Moreover, the UK’s energy system is more exposed to global gas prices than other countries because electricity prices feed gas costs straight through, industrial electricity prices are the highest in the developed world, and the UK has very little gas storage. A more balanced, practical approach is essential to manage the gas we will inevitably continue to use, to prioritise domestic production over polluting imports, and to build proper storage and contract structures that improve security, environmental outcomes, and industrial competitiveness.

Britain is facing a deep industrial energy price crisis, with many major industries collapsing or shrinking because UK electricity costs are among the highest in the world. Recent closures—from refineries to steel, fertilizer, and fibreglass plants—show how uncompetitive energy prices have already pushed firms out, long before the latest geopolitical price spikes made things worse. The core issue isn’t temporary shocks but a long‑term cost problem baked into the UK’s electricity system costs. To restore industrial competitiveness, Britain needs permanent, structural reform to electricity pricing—not short-term fixes. This requires three big changes: charge industry based on long‑run marginal system costs rather than loading full network costs onto them; reform the electricity market by moving away from gas‑set wholesale prices towards a capacity‑based “equivalent firm power” system that properly accounts for intermittency; and index carbon prices inversely to oil and gas prices to stabilise overall energy costs. Together with improvements in gas storage and long‑term gas supply contracts from the North Sea, these reforms would deliver predictable, globally competitive energy prices to support both existing industries and the more electricity‑intensive sectors of the future.

The International Energy Agency, at its recent ministerial meeting (Feb 18th/19th), agreed on one top priority: energy security. Hybrid warfare, cyber-attacks and the ease with which modern energy infrastructure can be disrupted underscore the urgency of the issue. The UK’s current approach – reducing domestic gas production, increasing reliance on imported LNG (liquefied natural gas), depending heavily on undersea cables, and an overwhelming emphasis on intermittent technologies – is making the country more vulnerable, not less. Two key factors are weakening the UK’s industrial resilience and national defence capability: its strategic dependencies, particularly on Chinese supply chains for renewable technologies; and the rising costs and intermittency of its energy mix. Despite the scale of this challenge, there are significant opportunities to rebuild a more secure, resilient energy system. UK energy is neither "home-grown" nor cheaper. High-cost energy, dependent on foreign supply chains, raises the cost of defence and the exposure to shocks, political or otherwise.

Several key industries have fallen back to production levels last seen in the 1950s. Car production has dropped to its 1952 level at around 700,000 vehicles a year—down by nearly 1 million in a decade—while steel is a shadow of its former output. Even cement is falling back, being increasingly switched to imports. Housebuilding is far below its 1950s’ and 1960s’ levels. The fertiliser industry has closed. Net zero technology is overwhelmingly imported (e.g. the batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, critical minerals and now EVs ), now mostly from China. Why? Deindustrialisation has multiple causes, exacerbated by the highest industrial electricity prices in the developed world. New digital technologies and data centres are highly energy‑intensive and need reliable, non-intermittent, round‑the‑clock electricity. The idea that we can simply become Singapore-on-Thames, relying on finance, law, tech, and hospitality, is at best naive. Traditional service sectors face rising costs from recent tax and wage policies, and global finance is becoming more fragmented and less open. Meanwhile, the UK continues to rely heavily on foreign investors to fund essential infrastructure, from water and energy to roads. The UK needs to focus on three big areas: competitive business taxes; affordable and globally competitive energy prices; and major investment in skills. Raising employers' national insurance, raising the minimum wage, increasing workers’ rights and signing ever-higher contracts for offshore wind leave what is left of UK industry reaching for the exit. Instead, we need a switch from business costs and taxes to consumers. It isn’t sustainable for voters to enjoy 21st‑century living standards with 1950s’ outputs. It will take a brave politician to tell the public some of these basic facts of life.

Many people in the Labour Party support bringing utilities like water (in particular, Thames Water) and electricity transmission back into public ownership. Supporters often present nationalisation as a simple fix: no greedy investors, no dividends, and lower bills. But, in reality, nationalisation is far more complicated and involves real trade-offs that are often glossed over. Financial risks of running these industries do not disappear when the state takes over. Under private ownership, investors bear the risk and expect returns through dividends and interest. Under nationalisation, that risk shifts to customers and taxpayers instead. If the government still borrows to fund investment, interest payments remain. If it wants to avoid borrowing, then customers would have to pay higher bills now to fund upgrades and maintenance — a return to the “pay-as-you-go” model used after the Second World War. Nationalisation also wouldn’t automatically improve how these industries are run. The state once had strong expertise in managing utilities, but that capacity largely no longer exists. There is a risk that governments use nationalised industries for political goals, such as freezing prices, which can lead to underinvestment and reduce service quality. Anyone arguing for nationalisation needs to be honest that it likely means higher bills today, real financial risk for the public, and no guarantee of better performance.

Why is it that this government, and its predecessors, find economic growth so hard to attain? In the UK, growth remains stubbornly low for a number of reasons, and these are not the ones that the government is currently blaming. First, governments avoid hard choices and spread resources too thinly. As Tony Blair said to me many years ago, politicians prefer to have "and" over "or" – in his case, nuclear and renewables. Political instinct favours doing “everything” to please all parts of politicians’ constituencies, but this dilutes investment and prevents large-scale, coordinated programmes. Instead of comprehensive strategies like those seen in China or France, the UK pursues piecemeal, case-by-case projects, resulting in high costs and inefficiencies, such as probably the most expensive nuclear plants in the world (at c. £12 billion per gigawatt). Without focused, long-term infrastructure programmes, growth cannot accelerate. Beyond this, structural issues compound the problem. Western economies, especially the UK, prioritise consumption over production, rely heavily on welfare spending, and maintain incentive systems that discourage work. High taxes and borrowing further stifle growth, while domestic savings – critical for funding investment – are minimal. Unlike post-war economic miracles in Germany, Japan and China, driven by savings and production, the UK depends on foreign capital and supply chains, leaving its economy vulnerable. A fundamental shift towards production, supported by domestic savings and programme-driven investment, is a prerequisite for sustainable growth.

There are five major lessons from COP30. They are not the ones the climate community has highlighted, but they really matter and will shape the post-COP30 climate change negotiations. First up is the realisation that it is no longer a European (and UK) game. The shifts in world political and economic power for the first time sidelined the Europeans. There was no UK “climate change leadership” to be taken seriously. It is India, China, Russia and the US that pulled the strings, whether present or not. Second, no major oil and gas producer or coal-burning nation wants to stop. Brazil set the tone: it announced that it wants to be the world’s fourth-largest oil producer, with drilling to start in the mouth of the Amazon. Third, no one wants to cut their carbon consumption, personally or nationally. The Brazilian carbon footprint includes the flights, the new road through the rainforest, the cruise liners for accommodation, as well as the commitment to its own fossil fuels. Fourth, the real action was on the bottom-up trade issues, notably the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and the emerging coalition of the willing with the extension of carbon pricing. The fifth lesson is that the temperature is going to go on rising: 30 COPs so far haven’t made a dent in the carbon concentration in the atmosphere, and another 30 COPs probably won’t.

As the Chancellor gears up to deliver the Autumn Budget next week, let’s look behind the headlines at the reality of what is going on with the UK’s economy and lack of growth. Despite what the current government argues (not very different from the previous incumbents), the UK’s economic stagnation is not so much due to a lack of new infrastructure projects or excessive regulation, but rather the chronic failure to maintain existing assets. Essential networks—such as railways, roads, water systems, and mobile connectivity—are in poor condition, creating inefficiencies and costs that ripple through the economy. Instead of prioritising glamorous projects like HS2, the focus should be on ensuring that current systems actually work. Well-maintained infrastructure provides resilience and reduces the disproportionate costs of failures, making it a cornerstone for productivity and growth. This is not a technical challenge but a matter of political priorities and regulatory focus. Current fiscal rules and political incentives distort spending decisions. The government re-labels maintenance as “investment” to justify borrowing, shifting costs to future generations and encouraging flashy enhancements over essential upkeep. True maintenance should be funded on a pay-as-you-go basis through current bills, ensuring intergenerational fairness and system reliability. Capital maintenance comes first, second, and third, with new projects only after existing infrastructure is robust.

British energy policy, once heralded as a pathway to cheap, secure and decarbonised power, has instead resulted in some of the highest energy costs globally. Despite the optimism of Ed Miliband and before him, Boris Johnson, Britain’s energy system is heavily dependent on foreign supply chains, finance and ownership. The shift to intermittent renewables like wind and solar has doubled infrastructure needs, while long-term contracts lock in elevated prices until at least 2045. Offshore wind, particularly in Scotland, suffers from grid constraints, leading to payments for unused generation. The government’s approach to nuclear, with its “let’s try one and see if it works” perspective, rather than a fully fledged nuclear programme, has followed an inefficient and costly path, further entrenching high costs. This trajectory poses serious risks to the UK economy. Energy-intensive industries are closing, and few new ones are emerging, as high energy prices deter investment. Britain’s apparent success in reducing carbon emissions masks a growing reliance on imported carbon-intensive goods. Without radical policy reform – renegotiating contracts, restructuring pricing, and rethinking energy strategy – Britain faces a future of permanently high energy costs and diminished industrial competitiveness. What is needed now is not our politicians flying off to yet another COP, this time in Brazil (with access by a new road cut through the Amazon rainforest), but honesty and humility in global climate discussions, urging leaders to learn from Britain’s missteps rather than emulate them.

The UK’s infrastructure costs are amongst the highest globally, making ambitious projects—like new nuclear plants, HS2, and airport expansions—extremely expensive. Hinkley and Sizewell nuclear stations together may end up costing more than the original full costs of HS2, and a new Heathrow runway could reach £40 billion. Even basic upgrades, like sewage tanks and reservoirs, are far pricier than elsewhere. While some projects, such as the Elizabeth Line and Thames Tideway, have been delivered efficiently, these are rare exceptions. The main drivers of high costs are higher costs of capital (due to high interest rates and inflation), low labour productivity, and fragmented project delivery. The UK often builds infrastructure as isolated projects rather than as part of coordinated programmes, which prevents investment in supply chains and skills. France’s programme of nuclear power stations building in the 1980s is an example of how things could be done. Unlike countries that use the state’s balance sheet or commit to long-term programmes, the UK’s piecemeal approach keeps costs high, discourages investors, and limits what can actually be delivered. Without smarter regulation and better planning, these high costs will continue to hold back progress.